Scope Ratings delivered a stark warning on Monday, 30 June 2025 over the fiscal impact of Nato’s revised defence spending target, cautioning that EU member states face mounting credit risks unless they implement difficult budgetary adjustments.
Meeting the 3.5% of GDP defence expenditure benchmark would require, on average, an additional 1.3% of GDP annually across Nato’s EU members, raising total defence spending to over $600bn--a sharp jump from the current $360bn. This significant increase threatens to widen budget deficits and push up public debt, undermining sovereign creditworthiness without a combination of spending cuts, tax rises or coordinated European-level defence funding.
Budgetary impact across EU countries
Scope’s analysis forecast significant variation in the budgetary impact relative to government revenues across member states. Germany (AAA/Stable), the bloc’s largest economy, currently allocates roughly 10.5% of its budget (1.2% of GDP) to defence spending. To meet the previous Nato target of 2% of GDP, Berlin had established a €100bn special defence expenditure fund in 2022. Following the March 2025 amendment to Germany’s constitutional debt brake, the government planned to fund the required increase in defence spending primarily through new debt issuance, which could mean more than €100bn in additional annual borrowing.
Should Germany attempt to finance the spending increase without new debt, the budgetary burden would amount to around 17% of central government revenues--far higher than other major European economies such as France (AA-/Stable, 8%), Italy (BBB+/Stable, 7%) and the United Kingdom (AA/Stable, 3%).
Spain (A/Stable), which secured an opt-out from the new higher spending target, would otherwise have faced the second largest impact at 11.4% of central government revenues. Belgium (AA-/Negative), with its comparatively small military budget, also sought greater flexibility given an estimated budgetary impact of approximately 8.7% of government revenues.
Defence spending shortfalls
In absolute terms, Germany’s defence spending shortfall stood out as the largest, estimated at around $106bn annually after the depletion of the €100bn special fund. This figure was more than twice the estimated shortfalls of Italy ($46bn), France ($45bn), the United Kingdom ($41bn) and Spain ($37bn).
Several member states already struggled to reduce budget deficits below the 3% of GDP ceiling set by EU fiscal rules, according to Scope’s analysis. Although greater flexibility in applying these rules lowered the likelihood of excessive deficit procedures (EDP) triggered by increased defence spending, the additional fiscal burden raised the challenge of consolidation for countries currently under EDP, including France, Belgium and Italy.
Germany was among a limited group of member states fiscally capable of absorbing the increased defence expenditure shock. Others included countries already meeting or nearing the revised spending targets, such as Greece, Poland and the Baltic states, as well as countries with fiscal space like Portugal and those rated AAA.
Germany planned to increase federal defence spending to 2.4% of GDP in 2025, gradually rising to the 3.5% target by 2029. Scope projected Germany’s debt-to-GDP ratio would climb from 63% in 2024 to just above 70% by 2030, noting that stabilising debt trajectories would require budgetary adjustments to sustain the higher spending.
Joint EU financing
Given limited fiscal space in many EU member states, Scope suggested that defence and security financing might increasingly shift to the EU level. Centralising funding could enable more sustainable, coordinated investment while delivering economies of scale in procurement.
The EU (AAA/Stable) had introduced the Security Action for Europe (Safe) initiative, providing a €150bn line of credit to member states funded by EU debt issuance. Safe loans would offer favourable borrowing conditions, including maturities up to 45 years and a 10-year grace period on principal repayments. Implementation was expected to increase EU bond issuance beyond the €662bn outstanding as of June 2025 and raise the EU budget’s interest repayment burden over the 2028-2035 multi-annual financial framework.
European defence industrial capacity
Additional EU measures included the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIF), which could allocate €1.5bn in grants by the end of 2027 to enhance cross-border defence procurement, supply chain resilience and manufacturing capacity.
Proposals under consideration involved creating a European Rearmament Bank modelled on the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This institution would be capitalised by willing EU and non-EU Nato members and financed through bond issuance. Its mandate would cover lending to governments for defence procurement and to companies expanding industrial capacity.
A broader Defence, Security and Resilience Bank was also proposed to support joint procurement, manufacturing scale-up and strategic stockpiling in collaboration with transatlantic and Indo-Pacific allies.
Among the 27 EU member states, only Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany retained AAA ratings from Scope, underscoring the uneven fiscal resilience across the bloc amid rising defence spending demands.


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