Manuel Maleki is deputy head of economic research at Edmond de Rothschild. (Photo: Edmond de Rothschild)

Manuel Maleki is deputy head of economic research at Edmond de Rothschild. (Photo: Edmond de Rothschild)

Although less dependent on Moscow, Europe remains vulnerable to disruptions in the global gas market. The increased use of liquefied natural gas (LNG) has diversified its supplies without guaranteeing cheap energy. However, vulnerabilities remain, and these could keep prices well above their pre-crisis levels for the long term.

The figure is striking, but it needs to be put into perspective. In early September, the Dutch TTF – the main benchmark for the European gas market – briefly exceeded €75/MWh, returning to its highest levels since the start of 2023. That is a lot. But it is still a long way from the levels reached at the height of the 2022 energy crisis: at the end of August, some futures contracts had approached €350/MWh, whilst the one-month contract peaked at around €314/MWh.

At first glance, the contrast is reassuring. European gas is currently worth just over a fifth of its value at the height of the 2022 panic. But this comparison is misleading. During the decade leading up to the crisis, the TTF typically fluctuated between €5 and €35/MWh. In other words, €75 is a relatively low price compared with the anomaly of 2022, but still very high in the context of the European market’s recent history.

That is the very paradox of the current situation. Four years after radically restructuring its gas supply, Europe is consuming less gas, has more suppliers and is far less dependent on Russia. Yet gas prices remain particularly vulnerable to even the slightest external shock.

From one addiction to another

The shift has, however, been spectacular. In 2021, Russia still accounted for around 45% of European gas imports. By 2025, this share had fallen to around 12%. At the same time, the share of liquefied natural gas (LNG) rose from around 20% of imports to 45%. As for European demand, it has fallen by nearly 20% since the start of the energy crisis in 2022.

Europe has, therefore, undoubtedly strengthened its security of supply. But it has not necessarily reduced its vulnerability to price fluctuations. Rather, it has altered the nature of that vulnerability.

Before 2022, a large proportion of the gas consumed on the continent came directly from Russia via pipeline. This dependence constituted a major geopolitical weakness, as the war in Ukraine has starkly reminded us. But it was also based on a largely continental supply system, organised around relatively stable flows and existing infrastructure.

The rapid expansion of LNG has made it possible to move away from this model. Shipments from the US, Qatar and Africa have replaced a significant proportion of Russian volumes and prevented the disruption to supplies from turning into a lasting physical shortage. By 2025, the European Union had become the world’s leading importer of LNG.

But LNG operates on a different principle. It must be liquefied at around -162°C, transported by LNG tanker, and then regasified at its destination. Above all, it is part of a global market. A cargo ship that was originally due to sail to Rotterdam may be redirected to Asia if a Japanese, Korean or Chinese buyer offers a better price.

This is where one of the key changes in the European market lies. Europe is no longer as dependent on a single supplier. Instead, it is increasingly dependent on the price required to attract that marginal unit of LNG. And this unit is now the subject of global competition.

A cold snap in Asia, a rebound in Chinese demand, an incident at an American liquefaction plant or a disruption at a major exporter can quickly feed through to the TTF. The war in the Middle East provided a fresh illustration of this, this year. Before the conflict, nearly a fifth of global LNG trade passed through the Strait of Hormuz. Disruptions affecting flows from the Gulf – particularly those from Qatar – therefore immediately put pressure on the European and Asian markets.

The result is clear from the figures. Between the end of February – the day before the conflict broke out – and early September, the TTF rose from around €32 to over €74/MWh, representing an increase of more than 130% in just over six months. A localised geopolitical shock in the Middle East has thus been passed on almost in full to European energy bills – a concrete illustration of what it means, in practice, to be dependent on the price of the marginal unit rather than on a single supplier.

The price of gas in Europe is no longer determined solely in Brussels, Moscow or Oslo. It is also determined in Doha, Houston, Beijing and Tokyo.

Lower stock levels, a more volatile market

 Added to this dependence on the global market is a second vulnerability this year: stock levels. At the start of September, European reserves were only about 67% full. Furthermore, the average masks significant disparities: nearly 84% in Italy, around 74% in France, but only 54% in Germany and less than 50% in the Netherlands.

These figures do not mean that Europe will run out of gas this winter. There is more infrastructure than in 2022, consumption has fallen and supply sources are more diversified. But stocks provide a safety net against any winter disruptions. The lower they are, the more Europe will have to turn to the LNG market when consumption rises. And the more urgently it has to turn to that market, the more it will have to pay to secure shipments.

This is precisely the ambiguity of European stockpiling policy. To protect against a future rise in prices, one must buy volumes today that are already expensive. And when all operators seek to replenish their stocks at the same time, this demand itself helps to prop up prices.

European regulations that tighten the rules

A third constraint could gradually be added to this equation. Since 2024, the European Union has adopted regulations aimed at reducing methane emissions associated with the hydrocarbons it consumes. From 2027, importers will gradually be required to provide more information on the production conditions of imported gas. This will be followed by the reporting of its methane intensity and, from 2030, the introduction of maximum thresholds for certain new contracts.

The environmental objective is hard to dispute. Methane leaks during production and transport can significantly worsen the carbon footprint of natural gas. However, the economic mechanism is worth examining. If the new European requirements reduce, even temporarily, the number of producers or the volumes likely to gain easy access to the European market, the available supply becomes less flexible.

The United States, Qatar, Algeria and Nigeria, moreover, called this summer for greater flexibility in the implementation of the scheme, arguing that certain provisions risked disrupting supplies.

Moreover, this mechanism is by no means purely theoretical. According to the US authorities, several European importers have already begun to postpone negotiations on contracts for deliveries scheduled for 2027, due to a lack of clarity regarding the verification procedures required by the new regulation. A contract not signed today means one less volume on the European market tomorrow – and, therefore, all other things being equal, additional pressure on prices at times when supply is in greater demand.

It would be an oversimplification to conclude that this regulation will automatically drive up the TTF. Its impact will be gradual and will depend on producers’ ability to adapt. However, it highlights a growing tension within European energy policy: securing more gas, diversifying its sources and reducing its environmental footprint are three legitimate objectives. They are simply not always compatible with the objective of cheap gas.

The return of cheap gas?

However, it is not all bad news. The global LNG market is entering a phase of significant expansion. New liquefaction capacity is coming online, particularly in the United States, and is expected to gradually increase the available supply. Earlier this year, the International Energy Agency predicted the strongest growth in global LNG supply since 2019. In the long term, increased capacity is expected to intensify competition amongst producers and put downward pressure on prices.

This is undoubtedly where part of the balance of the European market will be determined in the coming years: will the growth in global supply be rapid enough to offset the rise in global demand, geopolitical risks and the additional constraints on supply?

The answer is particularly important for Europe. This is because the 2022 crisis has often been portrayed as a crisis of dependency. It was also a crisis of prices. On the first point, Europe has made significant progress. On the second, the assessment is more nuanced.

At €75/MWh, gas seems cheap when compared to the €300 and above seen in the summer of 2022. It seems far less cheap when one recalls that, before the crisis, a TTF of €30 was already considered high.

Europe has reduced its dependence on Moscow. It has secured more supply routes and built a more resilient market. But it has also made its gas prices subject to a global market that is more competitive, more volatile and more sensitive to geopolitical shocks.

As for the return of cheap European gas, that remains to be seen.