The CEO of the Chamber of Commerce, Carlo Thelen, and the senior economist at Idea, Jean-Baptiste Nivet.  (Photo: Nader Ghavami/Guy Wolff/Montage: Paperjam)

The CEO of the Chamber of Commerce, Carlo Thelen, and the senior economist at Idea, Jean-Baptiste Nivet.  (Photo: Nader Ghavami/Guy Wolff/Montage: Paperjam)

Billed as a “trade bazooka”, the EU’s anti-coercion instrument is resurfacing against a backdrop of tensions with the United States. A credible deterrent or just a damp squib? The CEO of the Chamber of Commerce, Carlo Thelen, and the senior economist at Idea, Jean-Baptiste Nivet, decipher its room for manoeuvre and its limits.

"Trade bazooka", "anti-coercion instrument"... These expressions have invaded the European political and media debate in recent weeks. Far from a mere linguistic effect, they refer to a very real legal tool: the EU’s anti-coercion instrument, which came into force in December 2023 and is designed to respond to attempts at economic blackmail aimed at one of its Member States.

At the origin of the mechanism: the dispute between Lithuania and China in 2021, triggered by the opening in Vilnius of a Taiwanese representative office. The retaliatory measures taken by Beijing against the Baltic country highlighted the limits of the European arsenal when diplomatic tensions lead to trade offensives. It was against this backdrop that Brussels decided to equip itself with its own anti-coercive instrument. In particular, it authorises targeted increases in customs duties on products imported by the offending country, restrictions on access to European public procurement contracts and measures relating to intellectual property rights.

The instrument is back in the spotlight today against a backdrop of tensions rekindled by Donald Trump. The US President recently mentioned new customs surcharges on Europe, particularly in connection with the Greenland issue. In response, several European leaders, including Emmanuel Macron, have publicly referred to the existence of the "trade bazooka" as a reminder that the EU has the means to retaliate and would not allow itself to be subjected to economic pressure without reacting.

In fact, the mere mention of this tool seems to have helped to calm things down. Some American threats were quickly tempered. For some observers, the bazooka has already fulfilled its deterrent function, without even being activated. Others, however, such as the New York Times, believe that the anti-coercion instrument at this stage looks more like a "damp squib" than a real commercial weapon.

But what is it really? Paperjam put the question to Idea’s senior economist, Jean-Baptiste NivetJean-Baptiste Nivet, and the CEO of the Chamber of Commerce, Carlo ThelenCarlo Thelen.

Dissuade without penalising yourself

For Jean-Baptiste Nivet, dissuasion only makes sense if it is followed by concrete effects: "If we start formulating this type of threat, we have to be ready to implement them. Otherwise, we lose all credibility"

A credibility that is all the more difficult to build because, in his view, Europe’s dependence on the United States remains structural. This is particularly true in the military sphere, in the context of the war in Ukraine, but also in the technological sphere, where European alternatives remain limited. "The fact remains that the range of coercive tools that can be implemented is very broad, without necessarily affecting the American technological giants", he nuances.

If the instrument were to be activated, the EU would thus have every interest in avoiding targeting as a priority consumer services used massively by European consumers – electronic payments, smartphones or major digital platforms, such as Visa, Apple or Google – at the risk of penalising itself, both economically and politically.

However, undermining these players would also mean undermining the US economy itself. "The European market represents between 20% and 30% of the turnover of the Gafams, which are at the heart of American growth", points out the economist.

Other means of pressure

Carlo Thelen also points out that the relationship of dependence is far from being a one-way street. "The European Union remains a major economic partner for the United States. Trade between the EU and the United States reached nearly €1,680 billion in 2024, the United States absorbs more than 20.6% of European goods exports and cross-investment represented around €4,700 trillion in 2023. The prospect of restricted access to a European market of 450 million consumers is therefore also a significant potential threat to US companies. The reaction of US stock markets following the escalation observed is proof of this", he observes.

The CEO of the Chamber of Commerce nevertheless advocates a measured approach. "The United States remains a historic partner. An uncontrolled escalation could slow down innovation, limit access to key technologies and cut off investment opportunities. A trade war is not desirable. It’s a lose-lose situation"

For Jean-Baptiste Nivet, Europe is already engaged in a form of trade war. "We must not forget what happened in 2025 and since the start of Donald Trump’s second term. What is new is the geopolitical dimension and the disagreement over Greenland, but the positions taken on the subject are part of a history that began with Liberation Day on 2 April 2025 and had a major date at European level on 27 July with the 'Turnberry deal'."

As a reminder, since this agreement, the majority of European products exported to the United States have been taxed at 15%. The EU has also committed itself to massive purchases of American energy products, military equipment and artificial intelligence chips worth over 800 billion dollars, to which should be added 600 billion dollars of investment on American soil. "A rather unbalanced agreement in favour of the Americans, the calling into question of which is now one of the main levers of European pressure", analyses the economist.

"Trump has served as a magnifying mirror"

Beyond the anti-coercion instrument, these tensions are acting as a revelation of European fragilities. "Trump has served as a magnifying glass: military dependence, technological dependence, trade imbalances. One of the major lessons of 2025 is that China was more capable than the EU of responding to the US trade war because it had more means of exerting pressure," notes Jean-Baptiste Nivet. "It’s up to us to respond by making up for these weaknesses."

Carlo Thelen agrees: "Europe needs to accelerate its strategic autonomy, strengthen its single market and mobilise more of its savings. The reports by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi converge on this point. Mario Draghi estimates that around €800bn a year is needed in additional investment to close the European gap in innovation, energy transition and industrial sovereignty."

And concludes: "For our common prosperity, we must have a concerted approach between European countries and we must maintain diversity in our economic relations with powers outside the EU."