2025 was a turning point, you say, which moved the metal war from theory to practice. What changed things?
Jean-Wilfried Diefenbacher. - “As is often the case with this type of chain of events, there is a favourable environment and a trigger. We realised that happy globalisation, which turned manufacturers into assemblers with fewer factories, had probably reached a turning point. Repatriating value chains is not that simple. Hence a number of initiatives from the point of view of the European Union: the Critical Raw Materials Act, for example, the list of critical metals, the list of strategic metals updated every three years, and so on.
The triggers were major restrictions announced by China in early 2025 on rare earth export licences. Everyone then discovered what rare earths were, what they were used for, why they were needed, and above all the Chinese domination, not only in terms of geology - although Chinese territory is very rich - but also in terms of refining, which is the sinews of war. The second trigger was obviously the tariff war initiated by the US President between April and May 2025.
The conjunction of this favourable ground and these triggers meant that many industrialists, and to a lesser extent citizens, discovered or rediscovered Chinese domination in the mining industry in the broadest sense. They have also realised that having geological resources on one’s territory is not enough to become a mining giant, and have discovered China’s predominance in supplying subcontractors in industries as critical as automobiles, electric batteries or certain industrial segments.
We do not have the same political clout as the United States or China, but Europe is not standing idly by.
So that’s what happened in 2025, with a very muscular dialogue between the United States and China. The United States engaged in a communication war, announcing ever higher tariffs over the summer. The Chinese response was quite fine-tuned and considered, because it was prepared: responding with slightly lower tariffs, but above all attacking the American South Belt, drawing on very detailed knowledge of supply chains and critical raw material nodes in the largely pro-Donald Trump southern United States. This started to hurt quite quickly, hence the de-escalation and the draft agreements, still in the pipeline, between China and the US administration.
The next question is Europe’s place. Contrary to popular belief, Europe is not doing nothing. European decision-makers are aware of the need to engage in dialogue with the United States and China, both constructively and coercively, in order to protect national industry. For the moment, Europe sees itself more as a market than as a power. But it has put in place a number of measures to protect and finance its industry, and to secure supplies of critical materials. It takes time, there are a lot of us, and we don’t have the same political clout as the United States or China, but Europe is not standing idly by.
When China decides on restrictions on gallium, germanium, tungsten, etc., is this comparable to an energy embargo? Should these materials be regarded as geopolitical weapons in the same way as gas or oil?
“Not quite. There are two major differences between rare earths or critical metals and fossil fuels: the former are recyclable, the latter are not. Once you’ve burnt gas or oil, you have to look elsewhere for it. The volumes and values of oil and gas trade have absolutely nothing to do with those of gallium or germanium. On the other hand, even if the quantities are small, they are absolutely necessary, particularly for the defence industry. Are they geopolitical weapons? Not on the scale of fossil fuels, but with a very strong capacity to cause harm in specific industrial segments.
The Critical Raw Materials Act is this a real strategic shift or simply an attempt to catch up with the Chinese and Americans?
“This is an important link in a chain that has its own logic and coherence, and aims to provide the best possible protection for European production chains and European value segments. This is a fundamental step that must be taken for what it is. Moreover, it is very explicit in the text itself, with minimum contents of critical materials produced or refined on the territory of the European Union. It’s not incantatory, it’s not a gimmick, and it’s part of a trajectory aimed not at independence - let’s not be naive - but at an acceptable degree of dependence.
Do you consider the 65% maximum single-country dependency target to be realistic or already obsolete?
“This is a decision supported by industrial studies, but taken by politicians. So there will certainly be adjustments, in terms of numbers or duration, but the direction is clear. We’re not going back to zero.
The Chinese are writing down very clearly what they’re going to do. They publish their five-year plans. You just have to read them. Sometimes you get the impression that nobody does.
We realised, somewhat naively, that when problems arose with certain materials or rare earths, the Chinese had been very “greedy” since the 1990s, playing low profile, going all over the place without showing off too much, until we realised that they had got their hands on many of these resources. Can we make up for 20 years of strategic advance, and on what timescale?
“This will cost an enormous amount of money. We need to go back to the origin of the situation. Between the 1990s and 2010, it was the advent of happy globalisation. At that time, almost half of the world’s rare earths were refined in France, at the Rhône-Poulenc plant in La Rochelle. It was also at this time that the idea took hold that if a product complied with standards and was cheaper, it was welcome on the European market. That’s how the Chinese built up their stranglehold.
Yet they write down very clearly what they are going to do. They publish their five-year plans. You just have to read them. Sometimes you get the impression that nobody does it. At the time, it suited everyone. We thought it was the direction of history. In Europe, we thought that as long as we kept the design office and high added-value engineering, producing elsewhere was not a problem. There was also an element of cynicism: Chinese labour was very cheap and environmental standards were more flexible, which is still partly true today.
We are now trying to go the other way. It’s complicated, but we can make up for it. We know how to do engineering. If we know how to build nuclear submarines, we know how to refine rare earths. On the other hand, industry is a long process: it takes time to set up a factory and master a process. We can loosen the constraint within a bearable timeframe, but it will cost an enormous amount of money.
We mustn’t forget that this has also cost the Chinese an enormous amount of public money. This whole industry has been massively subsidised for decades. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the latest Chinese five-year plan no longer explicitly provides for public support for the automotive sector. From the point of view of the Chinese authorities, this sector has reached sufficient maturity to stand on its own two feet. We can’t make up for 20 or 25 years of massive support in a weekend.
Is there a risk that Europe will miss out on its energy transition, not because of a lack of technology, but because of a lack of metals to implement it?
“There is no global shortage of metals. Today, Europe is carrying out a large part of its energy transition in China or Asia. I am resolutely optimistic on this point. European legislators have opted for the electrification of mobility. Europe will succeed. On the other hand, it will be very difficult to compete with the technology and quality of Chinese vehicles. In 15 or 20 years’ time, the European automotive industry will probably no longer look like it did ten years ago.
Do we need to reopen mines in Europe to regain independence?
“Yes. We need to focus on segments where we can catch up quickly, but without neglecting the others. We need to consider opening mines in Europe. A mine is in the process of opening in northern Finland, the Keliber project. There are also projects in Spain and Portugal. It’s still marginal, but the direction is there. Is it complicated? Yes. But today’s mines are nothing like Zola: they are robots in veins, controlled by operators on the surface, in front of screens. If we’re not present in these segments, we’re only half sovereign.
We can erect barricades, but it will be complicated to make up in five or six years what it took them 25 years to build. There is an incompressible learning period.
How can we finance a possible revitalisation of the European mining industry, and why does private capital seem so skittish?
“In my view, this is a European effort, decided and led by the European Union. We can’t do it alone. Private capital is cautious because the prospects of profitability are poor in value chains that are still in their infancy, requiring colossal investments for uncertain returns.
The role of public authorities is to deristify these investments, in particular by providing visibility on commercial outlets. There are ways of doing this: commitments to buy back part of the production, a European fund dedicated to industrial competitiveness. Historically, there has never been an industrial revolution without strong public involvement.
If we don’t perform well on critical materials, will we necessarily have a technological problem?
“There is now American energy and digital dominance, and Chinese industrial dominance. In Europe, we are caught between a Chinese industrial protectorate and an American energy and digital protectorate. It will be difficult to avoid technology transfers from China to Europe. After 25 years of colossal investment, we have a lot to learn from the Chinese, particularly about batteries and recycling.
We can erect barricades, but it will be complicated to catch up in five or six years what they took 25 years to build. There is an incompressible learning period. The real geopolitical question is: will the Americans let us do it? Probably not. The alternative for Europe would be to become a huge theme park, with museums and hotels, but no more industry...
What is the risk if we underestimate the war for metal?
“The main risk is losing it. And losing the metal war means becoming even more dependent! It means accepting a degree of energy dependence even worse than that of fossil fuels. It means becoming even more vassals of the major producers.”
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“La guerre du métal”, published by Hermann Éditeurs, 2025, ISBN 979-1-0370-4395-5.




