On the back cover of your book “Welcome to the war economy!”, which comes out this week in an amended version*, you mention the need to acquire a new skill, “chaos competence”. Could you define this concept?
David Baverez. - “‘Chaos competence’ is defined first and foremost as opposed to ‘core competence’, which is the key competence in peace economics. In a peace economy, consultancy firms come in and tell you that you are very good in one area, that you should concentrate on that area and outsource all the other areas of the value chain to players who are better than you. When you move from a peace economy to a war economy, the key success criterion becomes dependency.
This new skill means succeeding in transforming these new dependencies into interdependencies. I have absolutely no faith in the concept of sovereignty. For me, it’s totally useless political jargon. In life, you are never sovereign. Chaos competence means understanding this new, extremely fluid environment, identifying our new dependencies and accepting that we won’t be able to eliminate them 100%.
On the other hand, you have to ensure that, each time you are dependent, you introduce a power relationship with the other player, so that you have an element of response if they try to constrain you.
When you’re an entrepreneur and your nose is glued to your production, your logistics, how do you implement this “chaos competence” operationally?
“You need a very holistic approach. It’s easier in large groups: you absolutely have to include a chief geopolitical risk officer in the C-suite. We see this in American and Japanese companies. European companies are lagging far behind. In small companies, it’s the chairman who has to take on this role.
The holistic approach includes sourcing, which needs to be diversified but at the lowest possible cost. You will never be able to diversify entirely, because you have to keep the cost down to a level that is acceptable for the price your customers are prepared to pay.
The supply chain needs to be reorganised strategically: supporting certain suppliers in exchange for total transparency of their activity, via IT platforms that penetrate the supplier’s premises.
Logistics needs to be rethought, because you are going to be forced to regionalise your operations. It’s no longer just manufacturing, but R&D too. If you’re in China, it’s made in China, by China, for China, including product design for China.
In the C-suite, you absolutely must have the production director, the supply chain director and the IT director.
Production must gain unprecedented flexibility. Demand is becoming extremely erratic. You will be constantly in and out of stock. A typical example: if a production manager can buy a year’s stock of rare earths today, he will do so. Result: one month’s orders for 12 months, then 11 months with nothing. We have to manage far more flexibility than we have historically.
Finally, we need bank financing lines that are out of all proportion to the past. When you have to stock raw materials for six to 12 months and your customers are moving from ‘just in time’ to ‘just in case’, you have huge cash flow gaps. Your financing has to be local. If a country says, ‘I’m kicking you out,’ but you’re financed by its banks, they lose more than you do.
That’s turning dependence into interdependence. It’s not just a consultant’s slide. It’s about changing the way we produce. In concrete terms, in the C-suite, you absolutely must have the production director, the supply chain director and the IT director. Before, C-suites were full of marketing and sales people. Today, they are no longer the ones driving the internal balance of power.
There is no demand problem. With eight billion human beings, there is always demand somewhere. The problem is production. We can’t source, logistics don’t work, there’s no electricity, even for data centres. The problem is as basic as that.
Moving from a peace economy to a war economy is not just about the defence industry. It’s not 2% or 3% of GDP. It’s the whole of GDP, with an unprecedented transfer of value from marketing to production, understood holistically, including the supply chain and IT.
Many companies are looking for visibility. Does the shift to a war economy still provide medium-term visibility?
“Long-term visibility is called vision. Today, successful companies are those that have a vision and stick to it. On a country scale, China has a major competitive advantage with a vision five, ten, 15 years out, to 2049.
In a war economy, this long-term visibility must increase. In the short term, however, there is no longer any visibility. It’s chaos. This is the planet of chaos. Short-term amplitudes are becoming enormous, particularly for listed companies, with unprecedented quarterly variability.
Europe [...] has understood nothing and remains in a peace economy, artificially supporting demand with crazy social programmes to the detriment of production.
With this spectacular exfiltration of a sitting president and whatever we think of him, is the US president, Donald Trump, fuelling these war economy dynamics, or is this a wider historical shift?
“The first to enter a war economy by prioritising production over demand were the Chinese, back in 2015 with the ‘Made in China 2025’ plan. We viewed this with a great deal of scepticism, as communist planning. Similarly, when Mohammed ben Salmane arrived in Saudi Arabia with Vision 2030, we looked at it with contempt.
But by 2025, he had almost achieved all the indicators set for 2030. These countries with strong powers were the first to enter the war economy.
The United States was slower, but reacted in 2025. That’s why I say that 2 April 2025 marks the start of the action, with ‘Liberation Day’. This is not a tariff war. It’s a currency war, against a backdrop of sovereign debt crisis, as in the 1930s. The one who wins is the one who devalues its currency.
The United States started doing this in 2025. The third geography is Europe, which has understood nothing and remains in a peacetime economy, artificially supporting demand with delirious social programmes to the detriment of production, which has become increasingly impossible on the continent.
What do you anticipate now? What’s going to happen?
“What’s always very interesting is that in a war economy, the official narrative is a lie. Churchill said never to believe a piece of information until it has been officially denied at least five times. There is a lot of uncertainty here, but one thing is certain: the official narco-dealer narrative and the official oil narrative make no sense.
There is no urgency on oil: prices are actually falling. So it’s not an issue. What is interesting, and we don’t yet have the answer, is: what is the truth? After one day, we can already say that what the Americans have done is logistically extraordinary. It’s something they try once every 30 or 40 years. The Bay of Pigs in 1961 was a failure. Nicaragua happened in between. It’s extremely rare for such an operation to be attempted.
This is not at all Trump’s folly, contrary to what people are saying. The American military, there is nothing more serious.
First element: for me, this is not a political event, it is a military event. It was not decreed by the American political authorities, it was decreed by the American military. In order for them to have succeeded, there was [extremely meticulous] preparation by the CIA going back at least six months. So this is in no way a folly on Trump’s part, contrary to what people are saying.
There’s nothing more serious than the American military. That’s why all the political commentary is completely missing the point. The real question is why did the military agree to take such a phenomenal risk? The risk of failure probably far outweighs the risk of success.
To my mind, this operation can only be justified by an imminent military threat to the United States. And the answer to this operation lies neither in the United States nor in Caracas: it lies in a mixture of Iran, China and Russia. That’s the real issue.
The conclusion, if this holds true, is that the year 2026 begins with a great victory for the Western camp over the strong regimes, whereas 2025 was the opposite: it was the year of the strong regimes, particularly China, which, at the Trump-Xi meeting in Korea, clearly had the upper hand and showed for the first time that it was dealing as an equal with the United States.
This morning, the Chinese banking regulator is asking all banks for their exposure to Venezuela. This is proof that China recognises that it has lost out and that it will be forced to take a loss estimated at $20 billion. For the Western camp, this is very good news.
What better way to start 2026 than with an incredible logistical victory. And the comparison is striking: Putin has been unable to topple Zelensky for nearly four years, and he has gained five kilometres of ground; the United States, in one hour, manages to neutralise the president of a country of 31 million people.
And you have the Taiwanese government, which this morning made a statement saying that this is extremely positive for Taiwan, because it’s proof that the American army can defend whoever it wants, while the Chinese army is totally ineffective.
The discussion about the role of the military in the United States is a recurring one. The impression has been that a strong politician is needed to keep the military in its place. Now, with Trump, we get the impression that the hawks and the US military have an open bar?
“This is my reading for 2 April. That’s why I have a very different view of the market on Liberation Day. It’s the ‘Ferguson’s Law’ of Niall Ferguson, the British historian: the moment your interest expenditure on your sovereign debt - I'm not talking about the principal, just the interest - becomes greater than your military budget, you lose all geopolitical credibility, because your adversaries know that you spend more money serving interest to investors than investing in your defence.
The United States [...] is not going to repeat the mistake of Iraq or Afghanistan by getting tangled up in a country of 30 million people.
This happened to the UK in 1945. For France, our interests will be twice our military budget in two or three years’ time: no geopolitical credibility left. And for the United States, last year, the two were equal: around 1,000 billion.
As far as I'm concerned, on 2 April, it’s the American military that's blowing the whistle and saying to the political powers that be: you can’t carry on with this deficit, so you have to lower the rates. We in the military are spending 3% of GDP. Before 1989, we were between 5 and 6%. And now we're at war with China. It’s official.
So we need to double our budget. We need an extra 1,000 billion. This is Liberation Day. The military says to Trump: ‘You have to bring us 3 billion a day.’ That's why we went from 2,000 billion announced at the beginning, then 200 billion, then 20. That's also why you have tariffs that were supposed to bring in 600 billion, then 300, but cost half a point of growth, so 500 billion. It doesn't work.
The only way is devaluation: currency war, with a devaluation of the dollar to transfer the adjustment to the rest of the planet. That's why the Chinese are saying: ‘We’re going to devalue our yuan at the same time as the dollar.’
I'm saying all this to show that this is the return of the military. There is a continuity between what has just happened in Venezuela and Liberation Day. Yes, the United States is in a war economy, but you'll notice that they're not at war: they left after an hour. They are not going to repeat the mistake of Iraq or Afghanistan by getting tangled up in a country of 30 million people. It's not possible.
And yet, you can see that it works: the country's president has reversed her position in the space of a weekend. On Saturday 3 January, she insulted the United States; on Sunday 4, she said she was ready to cooperate. That's why I say that we are living in a time when, in the space of a weekend, we are experiencing totally historic moments, but because we are in the heat of the moment, we don't realise it.
Our grandchildren will say to us: ‘Grandpa, you were there in 2025, in 2026... tell us about it. It was crazy.’ Whereas in Europe, in Luxembourg or Paris, we live as if nothing had happened.
The only major power that is not over-indebted is Germany. It all depends on what Friedrich Merz is going to do.
In the midst of this Asian, Russian, imperialist, almost Soviet, and American bloc, what place is there for Europe? And what place is there for a Europe that is still fragmented? Even if we wanted a European military power, we have no finance, no common technology, we continue to buy F-35s from the Americans...
“Europe’s place is as a big loser. Let’s be clear. We are still living in a peacetime economy. We haven’t understood. The negative thesis: you can’t reform a region with divided governance without an external shock. As long as the eurozone has a positive current account balance, there is little hope of reform.
When you look at the eurozone’s current account surplus, it’s largely thanks to the UK, which is itself isolated, extremely fragile, with a current account deficit, dependent on foreign investment. Normally, the UK should be one of the first countries to break up, taking the eurozone with it. So that’s the thesis that nothing will happen.
The positive thesis can only come from Germany. The only major power that is not over-indebted is Germany, which has €1,000 billion. It all depends on what Friedrich Merz is going to do: if he invests this 1,000 billion in digital infrastructure, energy infrastructure and decarbonisation, then, as things are changing very fast, we can imagine that in 2030 Europe will surprise everyone.
On the other hand, if half of that is spent on social programmes - we’re talking about 500 billion that could end up being used to buy votes in order to limit the AfD - then Europe will go nowhere.
What we need to watch is what is decided in Germany. In 2000, Germany made all the right choices. Schröder’s Agenda 2010 did all the work. And the other structuring choice was in 2009: it abandoned Europe for the export markets, saying: ‘I’m stopping vendor financing to Southern Europe, which isn’t paying me back, and I’m taking a huge gamble on China.’
At the time, everyone was saying that there would never be a domestic Chinese market. The Germans made this bet and it worked very well for a decade. And it broke down in 2020.
Can Germany reinvent itself?
“It has three problems. Firstly, defence: you can see that they are putting €380 billion a year on the table. Rheinmetall's sales have gone from €10 billion to €50 billion: [a] fivefold increase in five years.
This is typical of what I was saying: transforming dependencies into interdependencies. Germany, Europe, will always be dependent on the United States for defence, but it will become interdependent because Rheinmetall will be producing 50,000 shells a day. In February 2022, when Putin attacks, we only had 5,000.
Second point: energy. China has signed a binding agreement on the financing of Power of Siberia 2, the second gas pipeline that will transport gas from [the Russian company] Yamal to China. China is no longer going to buy LNG from the United States.
Total is anticipating this and lowering its capex in LNG, because a surplus is expected: Qatar is arriving in 2026-2027 by doubling its production. LNG prices are likely to fall sharply, which is very positive for German industry.
Third point: exports. There is no longer a Chinese market, no more growth in Chinese domestic consumption. We need to replace it with Latin America and Asean (Association of South-East Asian Nations), with Mercosur.
Hence [the fact that] Mrs von der Leyen is going to sign Mercosur, without authorisation in Europe, because France is telling her she has to go. So you could very well have, in 2030, a scenario - I’m not saying it’s going to happen - where Europe goes back up the slope in the next five years thanks to Germany.”
*‘Welcome to the War Economy!’, David Baverez, published by Novice, 2024, ISBN 9-782492-301445. The book is due to be re-released this week, 5 January, in paperback by Perrin, amended following the numerous geopolitical events that have occurred since it was written at the end of 2023.




