As soon as quantum computers start working, everyone will find themselves “naked”, all secrets potentially exposed for all to see. Some experts even claim that cybercriminal networks are currently storing data so that they can easily decrypt it when the time comes.
But the transition to post-quantum cryptography is no longer a theoretical exercise reserved for laboratories and long-term roadmaps. In a joint report published on Monday, Europol, the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC) and the Quantum-Resistant Working Group for Digital Infrastructure Resilience call on financial institutions to move to execution, by integrating quantum risk into their existing risk management frameworks.
Cryptography mechanisms that have become vulnerable
The document starts from a simple observation: a significant proportion of financial systems still rely on public key cryptography mechanisms that will become vulnerable as soon as quantum computers capable of executing large-scale attacks emerge.
To structure the response, the authors propose a prioritisation methodology based on two dimensions. The first is Quantum Risk, which aggregates the duration of sensitivity of the protected data, its potential exposure and the severity of the impact in the event of a compromise. The second is “Migration Time”, which assesses the complexity and timetable for implementing post-quantum solutions, taking into account the maturity of standards, implementation costs and external dependencies, particularly with regard to suppliers and regulators.
The combination of these two scores makes it possible to classify use cases as high, medium or low priorities. The aim is not so much to produce a fixed ranking as to provide IT departments and risk managers with a decision-making tool to arbitrate between immediate action, preparatory work and long-term planning.
Two concrete examples illustrate this approach. Payment terminals, at the heart of card ecosystems, are highly complex to migrate because of their dependence on hardware, long renewal cycles and the large number of players involved. If the quantum risk is deemed real there, the transition will require sector coordination and early anticipation to avoid costly out-of-cycle replacements.
In contrast, the public websites of financial institutions appear to be natural candidates for rapid adoption of hybrid mechanisms, combining classical and post-quantum cryptography at the level of TLS protocols. The authors point out that schemes such as X25519-MLKEM768 are already widely supported by browsers, cryptographic libraries and content delivery networks, greatly reducing the cost and complexity of an initial production rollout.
The need to initiate a transition
Beyond the use cases, the report stresses the importance of eliminating cryptographic “antipatterns” now, such as manual certificate management, heterogeneous TLS configurations or maintaining obsolete protocols. These practices, which are common in complex IT environments, increase technical debt and hamper the cryptographic agility needed to cope with the disruptions to come.
Without replacing regulatory requirements, the framework proposed by Europol and its partners is intended to be pragmatic and adaptable. It invites financial institutions to map their cryptographic dependencies, to take “no regrets” actions and to integrate the quantum dimension into their technological investment decisions. According to the authors, players who begin this transition now will not only strengthen the security of their data and their customers, but also their credibility in a financial landscape increasingly exposed to disruptive technological risks.



