Six banks could have audited the same LuxTrust services separately. They drew up a set of common terms of reference and commissioned the firm Wavestone to carry out a single audit, with each bank receiving its own report. The Association of Banks and Bankers, Luxembourg (ABBL) coordinated this first instance of pooled auditing in Luxembourg. The initiative was announced on 22 June 2026, in conjunction with LuxTrust and Wavestone. Its detailed findings remain confidential, as they may describe the service provider’s IT systems, security measures and controls.
“What is shared is the audit process, not the banks’ liability,” clarifies the ABBL. Each institution must verify that the common scope covers its own requirements, and then implement any measures that apply to it. The initiative implements a mechanism provided for under European regulations. Delegated Regulation 2024/1773, which sets out the application of Dora, allows institutions using the same service provider to organise joint audits and IT tests. However, they must retain the right to carry out their own checks.
The risk addressed by this audit had been identified prior to the entry into force of Dora on 17 January 2025. In its consultation launched in late 2019, the European Commission warned that widespread reliance on the same suppliers could lead to a concentration of risks, particularly where service providers are difficult to replace or data is complex to transfer. It had already been consulting financial sector stakeholders on the difficulties they faced in incorporating supervisory requirements into their contracts and on the possibility of standardising certain clauses.
Problems that have been known about since at least 2020
The impact assessment published alongside Dora’s proposal in September 2020 identified, amongst its eight issues, insufficiently monitored risks amongst IT service providers. It also highlighted incomplete contracts, the duplication of reporting obligations and testing, as well as the lack of recognition of certain controls across countries. It emphasised that a local incident could spread rapidly to several markets and jurisdictions. However, the impact assessment did not quantify precisely the administrative burden caused by the proliferation of reporting requirements and tests.
The first national assessments now show how these dependencies manifest themselves. In its 2025 annual report, published on 4 September, the Financial Sector Supervisory Commission (CSSF) identifies 260 reports of incidents relating to information and communications technology, which is approximately 20 per cent more than in 2024. This total comprises notifications made under Dora and those covered by CSSF Circular 24/847. The CSSF attributes this increase to the expansion in the number of entities and the categories of incidents required to be reported. It also notes that a failure at a service provider may result in several notifications, one per client institution. The 260 reports therefore do not necessarily correspond to 260 separate incidents.
In Luxembourg, 81% of reported incidents are not the result of malicious activity. The CSSF cites, primarily, service provider failures, problems arising during IT changes and human error. It also reports distributed denial-of-service attacks and successful phishing campaigns.
The report published on Monday 28 September by the French Financial Markets Authority (AMF) paints a different picture. Of the 47 initial reports submitted by portfolio management firms in 2025, 31 were ultimately confirmed as major incidents. Twenty-seven, or 87%, originated from their service providers. Of these 31 incidents, 22 resulted from cyberattacks, including 15 involving the exfiltration of internal data and seven involving the unauthorised use of the management company’s tools. The AMF also recorded two major incidents involving crypto-asset service providers and market operators.
Two stories, one origin
The results for France and Luxembourg do not allow the two financial centres to be ranked according to their exposure. The CSSF covers several categories of entities, two reporting regimes and incidents of varying severity. The AMF primarily examines 31 confirmed major incidents at management companies. This difference in scope explains why the majority of Luxembourg notifications are non-malicious, whilst 71% of the major incidents examined amongst French managers stem from cyberattacks.
Nevertheless, both authorities reach the same conclusion regarding service providers. In France, service providers were responsible for 68% of major incidents affecting asset management firms following a cyberattack and 19% due to accidental failure. In Luxembourg, their failures are among the leading causes cited by the CSSF and can affect several clients simultaneously.
The AMF also documents contractual difficulties. Some suppliers refuse to be regarded as IT service providers subject to the Dora regulations. Others offer standard contracts that do not include all the required clauses, or demand additional payment in return for granting audit rights, carrying out penetration tests or cooperating with the authorities. Small management companies have little leverage when dealing with service providers who are difficult to replace.
The first year of implementation also revealed late, incomplete or inconsistent reports in France. In November 2025, 23% of management companies surveyed by the AMF had still not put in place a compliant system for reporting their major incidents. The authority reports that it observed an improvement during the second half of the year.
An ideal approach to pooling resources in AML/KYC
In the Grand Duchy, Finance & Technology Luxembourg is working on a second form of pooling. The association is drawing up a standardised supplier due diligence questionnaire to prevent each institution from requesting the same information in different formats. According to Jean-François Terminaux, its chairman, the information requested is often similar, but the variety of formats increases the workload for service providers. The association also plans to open a charter for signature at its annual conference in November, according to the Lëtzebuerger Journal.
The joint questionnaire is designed to gather information; the LuxTrust audit focuses on the assessment of a shared service provider. In both cases, the financial centre aims to reduce duplication of work without compromising the controls required of each institution.
Dora has not uncovered the financial sector’s dependence on its service providers. It requires institutions to map out this dependence, to include it in their contracts, to report any incidents it causes, and to exercise their audit rights. The effectiveness of Luxembourg’s response will be measured by the number of suppliers covered by joint audits, the adoption of the shared questionnaire and the corrective measures decided upon individually by the institutions.



