A system failure at an IT service provider can trigger a cascade of reports. Each of its supervised clients must report the incident to the CSSF. The tally therefore increases several times, without multiple events necessarily having occurred. This is precisely what makes it so difficult to interpret the 260 notifications of incidents relating to information and communication technologies received by the regulator in 2025. Their number has risen by around 20% compared with 2024, following a much sharper increase – close to 90% – between 2023 and 2024.
However, these figures do not allow us to conclude that Luxembourg’s financial institutions experienced a 20% increase in incidents. The CSSF itself attributes this rise to a number of regulatory and statistical factors. The rise recorded in 2024 followed the entry into force of CSSF Circular 24/847. The rise in 2025 coincides with the implementation, since 17 January, of the European Dora Regulation on digital operational resilience.
Dora covers a wider range of financial institutions and broadens the scope of IT incidents that must be reported. As the scope of measurement has changed, a direct comparison with previous years is no longer reliable.
The regulator adds that “a few incidents at service providers” have led to “multiple reports” from their customers. The report does not specify either the number of incidents involved or the proportion of the 260 reports that are duplicates.
Four out of five incidents are not malicious acts
The CSSF, however, provides an indication of the cause of the reported incidents. In 2025, 81% of notifications were not linked to malicious activity. The most common causes are failures by third-party service providers, change management issues and human error. This figure does not, therefore, mean that system failures alone account for four out of five incidents. The category of non-malicious events encompasses several different situations. The report does not provide a breakdown of these.
Cyberattacks account for the remaining minority, although the CSSF does not provide exact figures. It refers to “several incidents” resulting from distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, as well as successful phishing campaigns.
The report does not provide further details on the severity of the incidents reported, their duration, their consequences for customers, any losses incurred, or the types of establishments affected. It is therefore not possible to rank the organisations most at risk or to measure the economic impact of the incidents.
The 260 notifications reflect not so much a quantifiable surge in system failures as the regulator’s increased insight into the sector’s technological vulnerabilities. They do, however, highlight a structural risk: financial institutions remain exposed to their service providers, to changes in their own systems and to errors made in their day-to-day operations, alongside external cyber threats.



