Sylvain Barrette: Tobam’s president and CIO, Yves Choueifaty, said in September 2024 at a conference in Luxembourg that the US was very far from an autocratic regime. Is that still the case?
Axel Cabrol: Whether a country is an autocracy or a democracy will depend on its democratic institutions at large. One must also assess the balance of power and the independence of the justice system. We may see today a president ruling by executive orders as concerning, yet nothing has changed on the institutional side. Institutions remain independent, the justice system continues to operate normally and press freedom is ongoing.
It is a very different situation compared to a country such as Turkey, where the authorities prevent a candidate from running and journalists are imprisoned. In Russia, journalists are murdered. We are far from such a reality in the US.
Are there indications of whether index providers assessing political risk are about to change their score/rating on the US?
Not for the moment. Besides, they do not communicate an “outlook” for credit rating agencies [Fitch, S&P, Moody’s]. They only provide qualitative comments. Yet these developments are quite recent. Should a change occur, it will come in the back end of the year.
China is the second biggest foreign holder of US Treasuries. Have you seen signs of sales by their authorities, or are they restraining themselves to avoid the strengthening of the yuan?
It is not clear. The answers may be in the FX crosses. The CNY is one of the few major currencies that has not strengthened against the dollar. News reports claim that the Chinese are responsible for the decline in price of the US treasuries (higher yield). Yet it’s not rational with the USD/CNY development.
Statistical monitoring is very complex. There is a national team of pension funds that is known to invest in Chinese equities in unison. The same team acts on US Treasuries. Yet these flows are not identified in international statistics, as they are not coming from the central government in China.
Should China decide to rebalance its FX reserves towards the euro, for instance, it will only affect the EUR/USD rate. Not the USD/CNY. For instance, they could sell US Treasuries and then go on and sell their dollar against the euro [to leave the USD/CNY relatively unchanged].
One must carry out an investigation based on the symptoms that we see in the market, but we don’t know [for certain]. This is typical of an autocracy. We will know only what the Chinese want us to know. There is a high opacity.
How has the foreign ownership of US Treasuries evolved?
The share of foreign ownership has significantly declined over the last 10 years, from 33% to 23% as of 2023. Through its quantitative easing operations [in the 2010s], the Fed has played a major role. The domestic private market has also played a significant role on the back of higher rates.
Since covid, the commercial balance of China with the US has more than doubled to $1trn, yet the People’s Bank of China has not increased its US Treasury holdings. It is therefore not backing up the argument that China accumulates US Treasuries to improve its bargaining power against the US on trade deficit negotiations.
Have the recommendations or instructions by the Chinese central government to buy Chinese equities had the expected impact?
It is clear the “national team” that includes banks, funds and pension funds intervened in the market. Then, afterward, there are articles in the press reporting on these interventions. There are no return targets. They are not going that far. Yet there are threshold levels at which point more interventions are taking place.
The Chinese have acted as if they had a plan. They were among the quickest to react with their own tariff.
Stock market performance has become a key indicator of the success of their policies. Having dropped by about half over the last three years, stock market valuation has become a key saving asset for an aging population given the difficulties of the real estate market [in the last four years].
How are Chinese asset managers performing?
Some years ago, we discovered some stunning statistics suggesting that 80% of the local asset managers invested in mainland Chinese equities were outperforming their index. It may be related to insider trading without punishment. Market institutions are not built to ensure fair competition between players.
What has Japan done with its US Treasuries?
Selling activity suspicions are directed more towards Japan than China, as the yen improved over the dollar [over the last month, from 150 to 140 today].
Does it make sense to sell US Treasuries for Japan, given the likely rise of the yen against the dollar and the eventual adverse impact on the auto sector, which is already hit by a 25% tariff?
Who decides in Japan? We know that things are coordinated in China. There is a bit more autonomy in Japan by the various market players regarding their investment decisions, which also include US Treasuries.
The Chinese have acted as if they had a plan. They were among the quickest to react with their own tariff.
On the tariffs between the US and China, who will move next? Who currently stands to lose the most? Any risk of direct conflict between both countries?
First, Trump announced tariffs that surprised everyone by their magnitude on 2 April, and less than two weeks later he announced a 90-day moratorium for negotiation. In the meantime, a lot of things have happened in the markets, in the American press and in the political arena that were not favourable to him in terms of balance of power. The US is not a one-man show. These events happened because China reacted with embargoes on rare earths and higher tariffs.
On the other hand, it is unclear whether there is an internal debate in China on the best way to respond.
Second, 90 days is both very long and very short. Very long because US companies will report [about Q1 earnings], and we will have a lot of information on the economic level.
As financial conditions may have deteriorated, many things will happen in the US.
In his book The Art of the Deal Trump basically told us that we must always start a negotiation by shocking the opposing party with things that make no sense to have a chance of bringing people to the negotiating table in good conditions. That could be Trump’s strategy.
In Trump’s last book written for the presidential campaign, he segregated the “bad” from the “good” China. The latter is a partner with whom we can do good business and reach commercial agreements, as with other Western world countries. “Bad China” is when it uses the economy as a strategic weapon. Trump’s plan is to protect the US against that strategic weapon.
With the advancement of AI through Deepseek, China has proven that it is an advanced economy. The US should take note and act accordingly when negotiating with China.



