Sylvain Barrette: What should we expect from the US Fed the European Central Bank until year end?
Alexandre Drabowicz: We expected four rates cut that effectively took place in 2024. We expect two more cuts in 2025 so that the upper level of the range will decline to 4.0% from 4.5%--against three expected by the market--and a further two in 2026.
We estimate that that the disinflation process has not been stopped but only postponed on the back of the tariffs with our headline expectation set at 2.9% in 2025. We take comfort from the recent speech from Fed governor Powell at the last FOMC meeting that stated that the peak of inflation may be temporary and should return to its downward trend. The Fed can therefore focus on growth and full employment while still contemplating further interest rate cuts.
Yet the University of Michigan consumer sentiment survey indicated the that consumers assess inflation as important, but this is not what we see in hard data. The truflation index published by Saint Louis Fed, I believe, displays a downward trend comforting us in our scenario. The trajectory aims at a normalisation of the Fed monetary policy.
What about the timing?
We could see one cut by the Fed before the summer and another during summertime. Should normalisation be confirmed [in the second half of the year], I believe that the Fed will have the ability to cut more in 2026.
What should we expect from the European Central Bank?
We already got two cuts from the ECB. We were expecting five cuts this year reaching 1.75%, the terminal rate. In February, the ECB published a study that reported that the ECB neutral rate--a monetary policy that is not accommodative nor restrictive--is assessed to be between 1.75% and 2.25%.
We believe that inflation in Europe will remain contained, and we think that spending in infrastructure and defence will not be inflationary. For one, defence spending is not accounted for in the IPC. On infrastructure, we could even argue that it is disinflationary as it may increase competitiveness and push electricity prices lower.
As the ECB decreased its growth expectation in 2025, it can afford to cut interest rates further as the extra spending on defence and infrastructure will be felt only in 2026.
Could tariffs have multiplier and delayed effects on inflation as they get integrated into the supply chain?
This is a risk. Contrary to his first term, Trump goes all-in at the beginning of his second term. It remains to be seen whether tariffs will be negotiated with exemptions or not. Part of the tariffs will be absorbed in margins, another part by the US producers, while currencies will also contribute. Clearly, there will be an impact on US consumers.
Trump has elected the maximalist approach on tariffs to support negotiations but will close the discussions with a pragmatic approach.
As Trump does not want to create a peak of inflation, we should expect a focus on economic support, tax measures and investments to boost growth.
Will greater indebtedness in the US and, even now, in Germany following the announcement of its recent spending plan start to bite the 10-year notes?
US treasury secretary Bessent and Trump are extremely sensitive on the development of the 10-year interest rates given the extremely high cost of indebtedness. More so than the S&P 500. With a debt load of $36trn, the interest charges of $1trn have exceeded defence spending in the US. We used to talk about a Trump put on the S&P 500. This has moved to a put on the 10-year treasuries. They moved from 4.75% in January to 4.20% today.
It is good news to observe that Bessent is focussed on ensuring a reasonable cost of debt ahead of the planned fiscal stimuli.
We have seen the opposite in Europe with the announcement of a European defence budget whereas Germany reported separately new expenses in defence and infrastructure.
German bunds increased by 50bps, the sharpest increase since the reunification of Germany, following these announcements. Yet increasing debt in Germany should not be a source of concern. Not changing the infamous 0.35% German budget debt brake, intendedness was heading to 40% of GDP from 60% by 2050. Including the new spending, debt is expected to reach 70% of GDP by 2030, a reasonable level for such a large economy.
It is a great news for the rest of Europe; however, the room for manoeuvre for the rest of Europe on further defence spending is less clear.
Recent bonds repricing has offered buying opportunities in Europe as we are not too concerned that the situation drifts away.
Year-to-date, non-US stocks have outperformed US stocks, a reasonable development given their large valuation discrepancies by YE24 and the uncertainty and the likely damages that tariffs will inflict to the US. Yet aren’t the non-US stock markets being too complacent given that a slowdown in the US economy will hurt them as well?
As for many, we were in the camp of US exceptionalism in 2024. As the overweight on US equities was so elevated, by year end, it is not surprising that a change of policies may change the perception on the US economy. There are growing doubts about US exceptionalism, but it is not called into question.
On Europe, we moved to a “hope” mindset. It worth nothing that its outperformance--in euros--has reached 15% to 18% compared to the S&P 500. We have never seen such an outperformance gap at the beginning of the year. In euros, the Euro Stoxx is at +10% and the S&P 500 is at -7%.
Foreign investors will not save the Chinese equity market. It must come first and foremost from the Chinese themselves.
On 4Q24, the earning growth in Europe was 2% while in the US it was 12%. It remains to be seen whether earnings growth by European companies will follow their stock performance.
Everyone imagined that Asia and, in particular, China would bear the brunt of the tariffs. Yet China was much better prepared for the new Trump mandate to absorb tariffs as it stimulated its economy in October 2024 thanks to some fiscal capacity and by implementing structural reforms. It has resulted into a strong stock market boosted by tech companies and increasing retail sales and industrial production. For the first time in almost three years, sales and prices of residential real estate are up.
A wealth effect at play for the Chinese consumers?
Exactly. President Xi understood that he will be unable to create wealth through the real estate market. Instead, he is targeting economic growth and higher stock valuation to create wealth. On the various stimuli announced by the state, it authorised share buybacks financed even by the central bank.
Foreign investors will not save the Chinese equity market. It must come first and foremost from the Chinese themselves.




