Digital banks are speeding up the pass-through of European Central Bank rate changes through the eurozone banking system, particularly on deposits, economist Katarzyna Budnik concluded in an ECB working paper. Photo: ECB

Digital banks are speeding up the pass-through of European Central Bank rate changes through the eurozone banking system, particularly on deposits, economist Katarzyna Budnik concluded in an ECB working paper. Photo: ECB

Digital banks made eurozone savers more responsive to European Central Bank rate moves, but they were less successful in passing higher funding costs on to borrowers, squeezing margins and slowing lending.

Digital banks are becoming a more important part of the eurozone financial system, with a growing client base, rising deposit volumes and a larger role in moving money across the economy. Unlike traditional branch-based lenders, they provide services primarily online or through apps, making it easier for customers to compare offers and shift funds quickly. That convenience has consequences beyond retail banking competition. It also changes how quickly European Central Bank rate decisions filter through the banking system and into the real economy.

That is the central finding of research by Katarzyna Budnik in European Central Bank Working Paper, published on 25 March 2026. Budnik found that digital banks strengthen the funding leg of monetary policy transmission because lower search and switching costs make depositors more responsive to changes in rates. In effect, savers at online lenders react faster than customers at traditional banks, forcing digital institutions to reprice deposits more quickly when policy changes.

The paper suggests this is no longer a niche issue. Based on a hand-checked universe of more than 170 digital banks across the euro area between 2016 and 2025, Budnik estimated that their share of banking assets rose from 1.6% in 2016 to 3.3% by end-2024, equivalent to about €1.4trn in assets. Their market shares in non-financial private sector loans and deposits reached 3.2% and 3.6%, respectively.

Faster pass-through to savers

The clearest effect showed up during the ECB’s tightening cycle. Budnik found that digital banks raised household deposit rates by about 37 basis points more than traditional peers after policy tightening began. Put differently, their household deposit rates rose by roughly 15bp more for every 100bp increase in the policy rate. Retail funding spreads compressed by just over 1.1 percentage points less than at traditional banks, pointing to materially higher marginal funding costs.

The gap was sharper among stand-alone digital banks, which raised household deposit rates by about 49bp more than traditional banks and kept retail spreads more than 140bp higher. Budnik argued that connected digital banks affiliated with larger banking groups were able to move more in line with the rest of the sector, partly because they could rely on group reputation and physical networks.

The biggest divergence came at the short end of the maturity curve. Post-tightening, overnight retail spreads were roughly 150bp higher for digital banks than for benchmark lenders. The gap narrowed to 60bp to 80bp for maturities of up to one year and to just over 50bp for longer tenors. That pattern suggests digital deposits are most rate-sensitive where money can move immediately.

For savers, the effect was positive. By early 2024, the median household deposit rate at digital banks was 1.2 percentage points higher than at other lenders. Digital banks therefore offered households a quicker route to better returns during the tightening cycle, even as that sharper repricing increased their own funding costs.

A weaker response on loans

However, the lending side told a different story. Budnik found that loan rates at digital banks rose by a broadly similar magnitude to those at other banks and in some estimates increased slightly less, despite the stronger rise in funding costs. That meant digital banks were unable to pass higher deposit costs through to borrowers in the same way they were forced to pass them through to savers.

The cross-sectional evidence strengthened that conclusion. Among non-digital banks, pass-through from household deposit rates to non-financial private sector loan rates was close to 80%. For digital banks it was near zero when measured against household deposit rates and about 35% when measured against corporate rates. Budnik concluded that digital lenders had a materially weaker ability to translate higher funding costs into loan pricing.

That mismatch is the key. Digital banks amplified the funding channel of ECB policy, but they did not amplify the lending channel to the same degree. The result was margin compression. Before tightening, return on assets at digital banks slightly exceeded that of benchmark lenders. During and after the rate rises, peers moved ahead and remained more profitable into 2025.

Higher rates preserved deposits, but at a cost

One striking aspect is that higher deposit rates did not lead to a clear relative slowdown in household deposit growth during tightening. Budnik found no significant relative slowdown in household deposit or retail funding growth at digital banks compared with peers. In level terms, that corresponded to roughly 40% higher household deposit and retail funding inflows at digital banks, on average, during the tightening phase.

The adjustment therefore came mainly through prices rather than volumes. Digital banks paid up to defend their funding base, and depositors responded. Household deposits at digital banks were markedly more rate-sensitive than at traditional lenders, with a 1 percentage point increase in household deposit rates associated with an 11.7% larger increase in household deposits than at non-digital banks.

But that strategy came with a cost. Budnik found that tighter policy weighed more heavily on digital banks’ balance-sheet expansion. Their quarterly loan growth fell by about 3.2 percentage points more than that of peers late in the tightening phase, consistent with compressed margins and higher funding costs feeding through into weaker lending growth.

Why policymakers should care

If digital banks continue to grow and gain market share, the ECB’s monetary policy decisions may increasingly hit bank funding costs faster than in the past. That could make monetary transmission more immediate on the savings side, but less even across the banking sector if lenders differ in their ability to reprice loans.

Budnik also pointed to a supervisory concern. Because digital deposits are easier to move and more sensitive to changes in rates, digitalisation could become a facilitating factor for a new type of bank run. The paper found that uncovered retail funding growth slowed more at digital banks than at peers after tightening, even if uninsured retail funding remains a small part of the total.

That means supervisors may need to pay closer attention to the composition and stability of retail funding, especially the split between insured and uninsured money and the speed with which funding can be repriced or withdrawn. For banks, rapid repricing can preserve deposit inflows, but it can also erode profitability when loan pricing does not keep pace.

In conclusion, digital banks are changing eurozone rate transmission not simply by moving faster, but by changing where policy bites first. They have made savers more responsive to ECB decisions and intensified competition for deposits, while exposing lenders to a sharper squeeze when rates rise. That is why digital banking is no longer only about convenience or technology. It is becoming part of how monetary policy works.