The recent signing of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union and the decision by this same EU not to publish supplementary information about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations with the United States brought up again a certain amount of criticism by different lobby groups.
If we consider the sole trade aspect of both agreements we have to admit that populations on both sides of the Atlantic should feel concerned, whether in favour of free trade or not. A look at mainstream economics allows us to understand this position.
In general this theory states that all participants (countries, hence consumers and firms) will experience net gains when economies tend to more free trade. So far so good, but how does this theory come to this conclusion? What do we understand by net gains and what are the underlying assumptions of the models allowing to develop these conclusions?
First of all the expected net gains should be lower prices, due to gains in efficiency on the producers’ side, and larger quantities of goods and services available, two facts that should improve consumers’ material wellbeing.
As these gains are “net” there will also be redistribution costs or, in simpler words, there will be winners and losers, due to a free trade agreement, a problem that can be handled on the political level depending on the ideologies dominating in the different countries signing these agreements.
But on the strict economic level a couple of assumptions are normally needed to come up with the previous conclusion: in the basic free trade models economists assume perfect competition meaning for example homogenous (strictly identical) goods and perfect information.
“Imperfect competition”
If we look now at the present discussion about the TTIP we can see that these two assumptions are causing problem: US and European goods are not considered as being identical and there are serious doubts about the available information.
Of course there are models of imperfect competition considering heterogeneous goods. These models also conclude that there will be net gains from trade: lower prices and a larger choice of goods due to the fact that consumers may choose between domestically produced and imported goods. But still, these models assume that information is perfect!
Now, economics of information tells us that collecting information has a cost (in terms of time and resources), so that these costs should be included in the calculation of net gains of a free trade agreement. This lack of information seems to be a major concern and the resulting uncertainty always has as a consequence reduced economic activity, hence reduced gains from trade!
Therefore the different stakeholders in this negotiation, free traders or not, have to take their responsibilities: firms have to give all information about their products, governments have to enforce this obligation and consumers have to take their responsibilities when making their choices based on available information, otherwise the anticipated net gains--however small--from such an agreement may even be smaller than expected.
Carlo Klein teaches economics and social sciences at the Athénée de Luxembourg and international economics at Miami University in Differdange.
