Since 2021, unit labour costs have risen by 24% in Luxembourg, compared with an average of 15% in the eurozone, says the Banque centrale du Luxembourg (BCL), which is damaging the ability of Luxembourg businesses to remain competitive with those in neighbouring countries. (Photo: Shutterstock)

Since 2021, unit labour costs have risen by 24% in Luxembourg, compared with an average of 15% in the eurozone, says the Banque centrale du Luxembourg (BCL), which is damaging the ability of Luxembourg businesses to remain competitive with those in neighbouring countries. (Photo: Shutterstock)

In its opinion on the 2026 budget, the Banque centrale du Luxembourg (BCL) documents a 24% rise in unit labour costs since 2021. This is a competitiveness shock that is far greater than that of the eurozone, is now structural, and whose effects go far beyond the debate on indexation.

Since 2021, unit labour costs have risen by 24% in Luxembourg, compared with 15% in the eurozone. This massive differential is not an interpretation, but a quantified observation documented by the Banque centrale du Luxembourg (BCL) in its notice on the 2026 budget. It now places Luxembourg well above its main economic partners in terms of labour cost dynamics. This is no longer a marginal gap or a transitory phenomenon linked to an isolated inflationary shock. It is a break in trajectory.

The BCL clearly identifies the two drivers of this surge. On the one hand, the rapid rise in average wage costs, under the combined effect of automatic indexation and real wage increases. On the other, the downward trend in apparent labour productivity measured both per job and per hour worked, which has been observed continuously since 2007. The mechanics are implacable: when labour costs rise fast and output per unit of labour falls, unit labour costs soar. This is not an ideological imbalance. It’s an economic identity.

This misalignment places the Luxembourg economy in a singular situation. Historically, the Grand Duchy has built its competitiveness on a rare combination of stability, high productivity, a skilled workforce and high value-added specialisation. However, the BCL shows that labour productivity has been falling for over 15 years. The economy is still growing in value, but less and less per worker and per hour worked. In this context, each point of wage increase mechanically weighs more heavily than before on companies’ cost structure.

Inflation contained, companies absorb

The shock is all the more significant because it is not offset by inflation that is persistently lower than elsewhere. Admittedly, inflation measured for households has been contained by public compensation mechanisms in 2022 and 2023. But the BCL points out that the dynamics of labour costs remain intact. The projected fall in inflation to 1.4% in 2026 is largely due to energy subsidies, and not to a structural slowdown in labour costs. In other words, companies are still absorbing a cost shock, even when visible inflation is easing.

On the labour market, the signals are adding up without cancelling each other out. The unemployment rate has risen to 5.8% in 2024 and could reach 6% in 2025. At the same time, recruitment pressures persist. The BCL sees this as a growing mismatch between the skills available and the needs of the economy. This type of configuration maintains wage pressure in certain professions, regardless of the cycle. It is therefore not simply a question of post-crisis catching up, but of the now structural functioning of the labour market.

The macroeconomic consequences of this drift are already visible in the breakdown of growth. Between 2022 and 2024, Luxembourg’s growth will be weaker than that of the eurozone in volume terms. The biggest negative contributions come from the financial sector, trade, business services and construction. These are precisely the sectors that are sensitive to cost differentials, particularly in segments exposed to international competition. The BCL does not speak of a direct causal link, but it does spell out in black and white the overlapping dynamics.

On the public finance side, soaring wages create an illusion of short-term comfort. Income tax receipts are rising, as are social security contributions. But the BCL points out that these revenues are based on an engine that simultaneously weakens the competitiveness of the productive fabric. This is an implicit trade-off between immediate budgetary returns and the potential weakening of the tax base in the future. This is not a projection. It is an internal contradiction in the observed trajectories.

“Exported”

Luxembourg’s singularity is further reinforced by the structure of national income. The gap between GDP and gross national income (GNI) reached €30 billion in 2024. A growing proportion of the wage bill benefits non-residents. The rapid rise in labour costs is therefore not entirely transformed into purchasing power for residents, nor into sustained domestic demand. It also feeds outflows, which reduces the macroeconomic shock-absorber effect generally associated with wage increases.

The BCL never uses the term stall. Nor does it make recommendations on indexation, wages or social negotiations. That is not its role. But it does describe, with figures to back it up, an economy where labour costs are rising much faster than in the competitive environment, while productivity is falling and growth is slowing. This triptych is not insignificant. It is rarely sustainable for very long without adjustment elsewhere in the system.

What the notice for 2026 shows is therefore not just cyclical tension linked to inflation in 2022–2023. It is the gradual introduction of a new cost regime in the Luxembourg economy. A regime in which the protection of purchasing power is very effective in the short term, but in which the balance between wages, productivity and competitiveness is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain without side effects.

At this stage, the BCL is not saying that this model is untenable. It shows that it is now under stress. And this nuance is essential. By dint of correcting shocks through public spending, supporting prices through subsidies and absorbing wage increases through the margin or the state, Luxembourg may have bought itself some time. But the notice for 2026 clearly suggests that labour costs have become one of the central points of fragility in the national economic equation.