The government's diagnosis leaves little room for ambiguity: Luxembourg is among the OECD countries with the highest tax burden on the second highest income earner. The text establishes a direct link between this situation and difficulties in accessing or returning to the labour market for part of the working population, with a potential impact on the overall labour supply.
The mechanism at work is well identified. Under the current system based on collective taxation and splitting, a second income is added to an existing main income and is immediately subject to a high marginal rate. The text considers that this tax structure constitutes an objective obstacle to entering or returning to the labour market, particularly when the planned activity is part-time or comes after a prolonged interruption.
The bill does not limit itself to a diagnosis. It explicitly states that "the single tax class will mean a lower tax burden for the second earner in a couple" and that, as a result, the second earner "will have more incentive to enter the labour market". The text goes so far as to mention a potential macro-economic effect, stating that this development "could lead to an increase in the supply of female labour".
This incentive logic is at the very heart of the choice of individual taxation. Each spouse is now taxed on his or her own income, according to a single scale based on the current class 1a. The partner's income level ceases to have a direct influence on the tax rate applicable to the second salary.
The tipping point clearly identified
One of the most revealing passages in the bill concerns the precise identification of the situations in which the reform becomes favourable. The text states that "the single tax class is also more favourable for a large proportion of married or PACS couples if the income contributor with the lowest taxable income contributes at least 25% of the couple's total income".
This 25% threshold is a structuring benchmark. It means that the reform mainly benefits couples where both incomes are sufficiently significant, while households with very unbalanced incomes continue to derive a tax advantage from splitting. The draft explicitly recognises this reality and does not seek to artificially neutralise it.
The text illustrates this advantage in concrete terms with a precise numerical example. For a couple with an adjusted taxable income of €100,000, the splitting method divides this income by two, i.e. €50,000 per notional spouse. The tax corresponding to this amount in class 1 amounts to €7,341. The total tax assessment in class 2 is then €14,682, excluding the contribution to the employment fund.
The bill draws an unambiguous conclusion from this example: "This tax advantage cannot be fully offset by the application of the new single tax class". In other words, the reform explicitly accepts that a tax model historically favourable to single-income couples will lose part of its advantage.
A 25-year transition as a social buffer
This is the background to the transitional period of twenty-five years granted to couples who are already married or in a civil partnership. Here again, the proposal is based on figures. It indicates that around 30,000 cases concern single-income households where one of the members is aged over 50.
For these households, the text considers that the capacity for economic adaptation is limited, the return to the labour market after a prolonged interruption being statistically weak at this stage of life.
The draft adds that these households have often prepared their professional, asset and family choices on the basis of net disposable income, as determined by the current tax class 2. A sudden change in the tax system would therefore have the effect of calling into question irreversible choices, which, according to the government, justifies a long transition in the name of the principle of legitimate confidence.
Taken as a whole, the bill makes no secret of its orientation. It recognises the tax advantage of splitting, quantifies its effects, precisely identifies the households that benefit from it and accepts that this advantage will not be renewed in the new system.
The accompanying measures planned - a childcare allowance of €5,400 per child under the age of three, the possibility of deducting pension contributions paid for an inactive spouse, an increase in the single-parent tax credit - are presented as targeted corrective measures, not as full compensation.
The reform thus marks a clear shift: taxation is no longer designed to provide structural support for the model of the single-earner couple, but to reduce the penalisation of work by the second income earner. This trade-off, documented and quantified in the bill itself, is one of the most structuring political choices of the reform.



